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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/161,816	09/28/1998	MALCOM B. STRANDBERG	DAVOX-142XX	8075

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EXAMINER

AGDEPPA, HECTOR A

ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
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2642

DATE MAILED: 09/10/2003

15

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

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**Advisory Action**

Application No.

09/161,816

Applicant(s)

STRANDBERG, MALCOM B.

Examiner

Hector A. Agdeppa

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--The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

THE REPLY FILED 19 August 2003 FAILS TO PLACE THIS APPLICATION IN CONDITION FOR ALLOWANCE. Therefore, further action by the applicant is required to avoid abandonment of this application. A proper reply to a final rejection under 37 CFR 1.113 may only be either: (1) a timely filed amendment which places the application in condition for allowance; (2) a timely filed Notice of Appeal (with appeal fee); or (3) a timely filed Request for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 CFR 1.114.

**PERIOD FOR REPLY** [check either a) or b)]

- a) ☒ The period for reply expires 3 months from the mailing date of the final rejection.
- b) ☐ The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this Advisory Action, or (2) the date set forth in the final rejection, whichever is later. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of the final rejection. ONLY CHECK THIS BOX WHEN THE FIRST REPLY WAS FILED WITHIN TWO MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(f).

Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date on which the petition under 37 CFR 1.136(a) and the appropriate extension fee have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extension and the corresponding amount of the fee. The appropriate extension fee under 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the shortened statutory period for reply originally set in the final Office action; or (2) as set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of the final rejection, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

1. ☐ A Notice of Appeal was filed on \_\_\_\_\_. Appellant's Brief must be filed within the period set forth in 37 CFR 1.192(a), or any extension thereof (37 CFR 1.191(d)), to avoid dismissal of the appeal.
2. ☐ The proposed amendment(s) will not be entered because:
- (a) ☐ they raise new issues that would require further consideration and/or search (see NOTE below);
  - (b) ☐ they raise the issue of new matter (see Note below);
  - (c) ☐ they are not deemed to place the application in better form for appeal by materially reducing or simplifying the issues for appeal; and/or
  - (d) ☐ they present additional claims without canceling a corresponding number of finally rejected claims.

NOTE: \_\_\_\_\_.

3. ☐ Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s): \_\_\_\_\_.
4. ☐ Newly proposed or amended claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ would be allowable if submitted in a separate, timely filed amendment canceling the non-allowable claim(s).
5. ☒ The a) ☐ affidavit, b) ☐ exhibit, or c) ☒ request for reconsideration has been considered but does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because: See Continuation Sheet.
6. ☐ The affidavit or exhibit will NOT be considered because it is not directed SOLELY to issues which were newly raised by the Examiner in the final rejection.
7. ☐ For purposes of Appeal, the proposed amendment(s) a) ☐ will not be entered or b) ☐ will be entered and an explanation of how the new or amended claims would be rejected is provided below or appended.

The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows:

Claim(s) allowed: \_\_\_\_\_.

Claim(s) objected to: \_\_\_\_\_.

Claim(s) rejected: \_\_\_\_\_.

Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration: \_\_\_\_\_.

8. ☐ The proposed drawing correction filed on \_\_\_\_\_ is a) ☐ approved or b) ☐ disapproved by the Examiner.
9. ☐ Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449) Paper No(s). \_\_\_\_\_.
10. ☐ Other: \_\_\_\_\_

Examiner: Hector A. Agdeppa  
703-305-1844

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Continuation of 5. does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because:

As to Applicant's argument that the "two-step test" has not been satisfied by the prior art, Examiner maintains the previous rejection. Inasmuch as telephony is the type of art wherein many features and functionality have been developed and integrated, a predictive dialer or continuous redial feature is extremely old and well known and used in call centers, in intelligent networks, in normal PSTN networks, in computer integrated networks, etc. Just like speed dialing, caller ID, or call lists in the past resided ONLY within a stand-alone telephone unit, now such features may be implemented in the actual network such as a central office. While Examiner can appreciate Applicant's argument, the cited case law simply is not applicable in telephony arts in this instance because of the overwhelming obviousness of taking a function/feature invented in 1977 (Sutton) and applying that feature to a more recent telephony network.

Design of telephony systems in recent times involve many times, merely picking and choosing features or functionality already existing and integrating them into a system. Some systems have call forwarding and call waiting and speed dialing. Another system might employ those features but also may add caller ID. Such is only an obvious design preference chosen by one of ordinary skill in the art. The two-step test is therefore satisfied. Also, Examiner would find Applicant hard-pressed to find a telephone unit that nowadays ONLY makes outbound calls. Therefore, to base Applicant's argument on the fact, for example, that Sutton is not analogous art merely because in 1977, the invention taught only outdialing is not persuasive. Using Applicant's reasoning, an argument could be made that the invention of Sutton which in

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1977 used now-outdated circuitry and logic components, has a different purpose and scope than if the same system or features were implemented via software in more recent times. Clearly, such an argument would not be persuasive either.

As to Applicant's remaining arguments, again, the features and systems disclosed in both Bateman et al. and Szlam et al. are so old and well known that again, while no mention is specifically made of predictive dialers, linking the two references, predictive dialers are almost a standard feature of ANY call center. Examiner would again, find Applicant hard-pressed to deny this.

Also, in response to applicant's argument that there is no suggestion to combine the references, the examiner recognizes that obviousness can only be established by combining or modifying the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention where there is some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to do so found either in the references themselves **or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art**. See *In re Fine*, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988) and *In re Jones*, 958 F.2d 347, 21 USPQ2d 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

In addition, a suggestion/motivation **need not be expressly stated** in one or all of the references used to show obviousness. *Cable Electric Products, Inc. V. Genmark, Inc.*, 770 F.2d 1015, 1025, 226 USPQ 881, 886 (Fed. Cir. 1985); *In re Sheckler*, 438 F.2d 999, 1001, 168 USPQ 716, 717 (CCPA 1971). It is assumed that every reference relies to some extent on the knowledge of persons skilled in the art to complement that which is disclosed therein. Further, the skilled artisan is presumed to know something more about the art than only what is disclosed in the applied references. In other

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words, **the person having ordinary skill in the art has a level of knowledge apart from the content of the references.** *In re Bode*, 550 F.2d 656, 660, 193 USPQ 12, 16 (CCPA 1977); *In re Jacoby*, 309 F.2d 513, 516, 135 USPQ 317, 319 (CCPA 1969)

This relates to suggestion/motivation in that "having established that this knowledge was in the art, the Examiner could then properly rely ... on a conclusion of obviousness 'from **common knowledge and common sense** of the person of ordinary skill in the art without any specific hint or suggestion in a particular reference'." *In re Bozek*, 416 F.2d 1385, 1390, 163 USPQ 545, 549 (CCPA 1969).

In response to applicant's argument that the examiner's conclusion of obviousness is based upon improper hindsight reasoning, it must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. See *In re McLaughlin*, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971).



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